The course will be organized around three big questions:
(1) What are "mind-brain identity" theories, and how should we
assess them?
(2) What are the implications of Kripke's classic text Naming
and Necessity for the study of thought?
(3) What are "innateness" hypotheses, and why have philosophers
of mind been so interested in them?
Unsurprisingly, there are connections among these questions. Equally unsurprisingly, issues about thought shade off into issues about language and reality. (The course will satisfy the department's "core" requirement in Mind-Language-Metaphysics.) With regard to (1), readings will include excerpts from Descartes and Ryle, some survey articles, and papers by: Smart, Armstrong, Lewis, Davidson, Fodor, Kim, Hornsby, Antony & Levine. With regard to (2), we'll read Naming and Necessity, emphasizing some portions more than others; then we'll look at some aspects of "the internalism/externalism debate", which is often thought to be (somehow) related to Kripke's work. Readings will include articles by: Putnam, Burge, Kaplan, and Fodor. We'll address (3) as time permits, perhaps exploring connections between "innate ideas" and internalist conceptions of thought and knowledge. My hope is that we'll have time to read a little Locke and Leibniz, and then think a bit about "poverty of stimulus" arguments associated with Chomsky. There will, obviously, be more to talk about than we will have time to talk about.
Course Requirements
Readings
Tentative Schedule:
Sept 9: Stage-setting: Decartes, Ryle, and Clever
Clowns
Sept 16: Australian Identities: Smart, Armstrong, Lewis
Sept 23: Token Identities: Davidson, Fodor
Sept 30: Disjunctive Reductionism and Discontents: Kim,
Lewis; Fodor, Antony & Levine
Oct 7: Personal, Subpersonal, and Leibniz Law Arguments:
Dennett, Strawson, Hornsby
Oct 14: Naming and Necessity: Lecture 1
Oct 21: Naming and Necessity: Lecture 2
Oct 28: Naming and Necessity: Lecture 3
Nov 4: Twin Earth and Indexicality: Putnam, Kaplan, Fodor
Nov 11: Individualism and the Meaningful: Burge,
Evans
Nov 18: What's a Propositional Attitude, and What are
Propositions (for)? Fodor, Kaplan
Nov 25: Innateness, exact readings TBA (and dependent on whether
we're on schedule)
Dec 2: But at least one session on: Innate Ideas
Dec 9: And at least one session on: How to Construct/Rebut
a Poverty of Stimulus Argument
Take-home final handed out. (Due Dec. 20)
Dec 16: Review Session for Final Exam (optional)
Dec. 20: Take-home exam due (not optional)