Working Papers

Dan Vincent

Downloadable Papers

Daniel R. Vincent

Department of Economics

University of Maryland

College Park, MD

20742

(301)-405 3485

(301)-405-3542 (FAX)

dvincent@umd.edu (e-mail)

  1. Schwartz, Marius and Daniel Vincent,  “Quantity “Forcing” and Exclusion: Bundled Discounts and Nonlinear Pricing”
  2. Manelli, Alejandro M. and Daniel R. Vincent, "Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple Good Monopoly” , August, 2004.
  3. Manelli, Alejandro M. and Daniel R. Vincent, "Bundling as an Optimal Mechanism by a Multiple-Good Monopolist” , June, 2004.
  4. Manelli, Alejandro M. and Daniel R. Vincent, "Duality in Procurement Design” , November, 2003.
  5. Schwartz, Marius and Daniel R. Vincent, "The No Surcharge Rule and Card User Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payment Network", October, 2003.
  6.  Vincent, Daniel R.  "Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships," (Earlier version as "Bilateral Monopoly, Nondurable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships," CMSEMS DP No. 832, May 1989.)  International Economic Review(1998),. (Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))
  7.  McAfee, R. Preston., and Daniel R. Vincent.  "Sequentially Optimal Auctions."  Games and Economic Behavior (1997).(Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))
  8.  McAfee, R. Preston., Wendy Takacs., and Daniel R. Vincent. "Tarrifying Auctions."   Rand Journal (Spring,1999).(Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))
  9.  McAfee, R. Preston., Daniel C. Quan., and Daniel R. Vincent. "How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids with an Application to Real Estate Auctions."  Journal of Industrial Economics (2002) (Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))
  10.  Vincent, Daniel R., and Motty Perry.  "Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations."  International Economic Review (2002).(Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))

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